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Neoplatonism in the  
Risala (De intellectu) of Alfarabi 
 
 
 
 
The Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus played an important role in 
the development of the Aristotelian concepts of intellect and percep-
tion in the Arabic commentators on Aristotle. Plotinus was not known 
to Arab scholars by name, but books Four to Six of the Enneads from 
the third century, as compiled by Porphyry, were paraphrased in the 
text called the Theology of Aristotle, which was translated between 
833 and 842 by the circle of al-Kindi in Baghdad. The translation 
combined Aristole, Plotinus, and Christian and Islamic doctrines, and 
had a significant effect on early Islamic philosophy. The al-Kindi cir-
cle also translated the Elements of Theology of Proclus in the ninth 
century. An Arabic work derived from the Elements of Theology, 
called Kitab al-khayr al-mahd, was believed to have been written in 
an early school of Neoplatonism in the eighth or ninth century in the 
Near East. It was translated into Latin as the Liber de Causis or Liber 
Aristotelis de Expositione Bonitatis Purae, by Gerard of Cremona in 
1180. 
      Three Arabic philosophers in particular, called Commentators on 
Aristotle, incorporated Neoplatonism into their philosophies. Abu 
Nasr Alfarabi is considered to be the first Islamic philosopher to in-
corporate Neoplatonism, in the early tenth century in Baghdad. He is 
called the “Father of Islamic Neoplatonism.” Avicenna or Ibn Sina is 
considered to be the most important philosopher to combine Neopla-
tonism and Islamic philosophies, at the beginning of the eleventh cen-
tury in Persia. Averroes or Ibn Rushd is considered to be the last 
important Arabic philosopher to incorporate Neoplatonism, in the 
twelfth century in Seville. The formation of thoughts and images in 
perception, brought about in material intellect by agent intellect, as 
described by Alfarabi in the Risala or De intellectu, Avicenna in the 
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Liber Naturalis and Shifa: De anima, and Averroes in the Long Com-
mentary on the De anima, correspond to passages in the Enneads of 
Plotinus. 
      In the Risala fi’l-‘aql (25–27), also known as De intellectu, or Let-
ter Concerning the Intellect, Alfarabi wrote that the light of the sun, or 
transparency (from Aristotle, De anima 2.7.418b9–10), makes the eye, 
or potential vision, transparent or illuminated itself. When both the 
eye and the medium of the sensible world are transparent, that is, 
when they are illuminated and can see the intelligible, then vision is 
possible. Colors become actually visible, and potential vision becomes 
actual vision. In the same way, active intellect makes potential intel-
lect transparent, and nous make discursive reason transparent. The 
transparency of light and color illuminates the intellect in the process 
of perception, making intelligibles transparent to reason. Alfarabi 
compared what he called the “agent intellect” to the sun, and the po-
tential intellect to the eye in darkness; it is the agent intellect which 
illuminates potential intellect and allows it to be active intellect.1  
      Alfarabi distinguishes between a potential intelligible and an ac-
tual intelligible, and it is the agent intellect which is necessary as an 
entelechy, like the light of the sun, to make the potential intelligible 
understandable to the potential or material intellect, as a transparent 
medium, or mediating device. Darkness is potential transparency, and 
transparency is defined as illumination by a luminous source, that is, 
the sun. It is the agent intellect which thinks the archetypes and intel-
ligibles, mathematics and geometry, abstractions of material forms. 
The divisible and impermanent form in matter, the form in vision, be-
comes the eternal and indivisible form in the agent intellect, as the 
particular becomes the universal. 
      In Alfarabi’s interpretation there are in fact four intellects, or four 
senses in intellect: in potentiality, in actuality, acquired, and agent. 
The potential intellect can be seen as the material intellect, and the 
agent intellect can be seen as the active intellect. Intellect in actuality 
is intellect which knows actual intelligibles, and acquired intellect is 
intellect which knows that it knows actual intelligibles, or self-
conscious reason. Intellect in potentiality contains an essence which is 
prepared to “abstract the quiddities” of existing things, as he describes 
in the Risala (Hyman, p. 215), and to abstract form from matter. In ab-
stracting the essence of material things, intellect makes “a form for it-
self,” that is, it understands the material thing as a form, and the 
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material thing ceases to exist as matter and comes to exist as form to 
intellect. The form of the material thing is the intelligible; intellect in 
its acquired state understands that it understands the thing not in its 
matter but in its form, which is not the product of perception but rather 
the product of intellection. The material thing itself does not define its 
own existence to intellect as an intelligible, rather it is intellect which 
defines it as an intelligible, so the material thing does not exist other 
than as being understood as an intelligible by intellect.  
      Alfarabi uses the analogy of the impression in the piece of wax to 
describe the difference between the intelligible and the material. The 
essence of matter is that element of matter in which “form comes to 
be,” the potential for matter to be understood by intellect as form, in 
the same way that the essence of potential intellect is its capacity to 
understand the form. When an impression is stamped on a piece of 
wax, the impression takes possession of the matter, and the matter be-
comes the form in its totality. Even the part of the wax which does not 
take the impression is defined in relation to the impression. The totali-
ty is especially complete if the impression on the wax transforms the 
wax in three dimensions, in the form of a cube or sphere for example. 
In that case, there can be no distinction between the quiddity or es-
sence of the wax in its material existence and the quiddity of the form 
of the wax. In the same way, the essence of intellect in potentiality 
cannot be distinguished from the form of the intelligible in intellect. In 
both cases, the form takes possession of the material in all dimensions, 
sinks through it completely, and achieves a complete identity.  
      In the Risala, Alfarabi defines thinking itself as the process of in-
telligibles becoming forms for intellect, in intellect in actuality, and as 
a result intellect itself becoming the forms of the intelligibles, in ac-
quired intellect. In the Enneads (IV.3.30), of Plotinus, “an image ac-
companies every intellectual act.”2 The image as mnemic residue, the 
impression abstracted from the material, is a “picture of thought” in 
Plotinus’ words. The mechanism by which the intelligible is incorpo-
rated into thinking or intellection, defined as the image-making power, 
must be, according to Plotinus, language, as in the Enneads “the re-
ception into the image-making power would be of the verbal expres-
sion which accompanies the act of intelligence.” The word belongs to 
discursive thought, revealing what lies hidden within, beneath the 
conceptual processes in intellect in potentiality or intellect in actuality, 
which can be apprehended by thought itself, in acquired intellect. Ac-
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cording to Plotinus, “the intellectual act is without parts and has not, 
so to speak, come out into the open, but remains unobserved with-
in…,” within the mechanisms of potential and acquired intellect in 
language. The intellectual act, actual intellect or Intellectual Principle 
of Plotinus, is without parts just as the material object is without parts 
once it has been understood as an impression in abstraction and 
processed in the imagination.       
      Following that, for Plotinus, “the verbal expression unfolds its 
content and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making 
power, and so shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is 
how there is apprehension and persistence and memory of it.” In the 
Enneads of Plotinus, while perception grasps the “impressions printed 
upon the Animate by sensation” (I.1.7), through the mnemic residue, 
“nothing will prevent a perception from being a mental image for that 
which is going to remember it, and the memory and the retention of 
the object from belonging to the image-making power” (IV.3.29), or 
the imagination, in the process of thinking or intellection. In the repre-
sentation in the mnemic residue, “what was seen is present in this 
when the perception is no longer there. If then the image of what is 
absent is already present in this, it is already remembering, even if the 
presence is only for a short time.” In discursive reason the presence of 
the image is ephemeral, while it is permanent in the intellectual, or ac-
tive intellect. It is through memory that an image accompanies every 
intellectual act.       
      The function of language, or the extent to which language can 
function, is as the mirror reflection of discursive reason, in the facilita-
tion of memory. The mechanism of perception mediates between the 
sensible world of objects in nature and the inaccessible intellectual, or 
nous, in a dialectical process between the subject and the world. There 
must then be according to Plotinus an “affection which lies between 
the sensible and the intelligible,” which is seen as “a proportional 
mean somehow linking the two extremes to each other” (IV.6.1). In 
the perception of an object, “we look there where it is and direct our 
gaze where the visible object is situated in a straight line from us…” 
In other words, the material object which is being perceived is already 
apprehended by the perceiving subject in relation to the perceiving 
mechanism, in the mechanism of intellect involving the mnemic resi-
due and representational forms in language.  
      The formation of the image is the process by which sensible forms 
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are recognized as manifestations of ideas of forms in perception, and 
are thus able to participate in the universal through perception, in the 
same way that forms in the Reason Principle of Plotinus are trans-
formed in the Intellectual Principle. In the Intellectual Principle, forms 
are self-generating and self-supporting, and it is in the image of pic-
ture-thinking, through perception, that forms in matter are possible. 
Forms in matter depend on the development of Reason Principle to 
form; all mental images are pre-generated by the reasoning process, 
through perception. In the Enneads, “The faculty of perception in the 
Soul cannot act by the immediate grasping of sensible objects, but on-
ly by the discerning of impressions printed upon the Animate by sen-
sation: these perceptions are already Intelligibles, while the outer 
sensation is a mere phantom of the other (of that in the Soul) which is 
nearer to Authentic-Existence as being an impassive reading of Ideal-
Forms” (I.1.7). The discerning of impressions printed upon the soul by 
sensation is the function of reason, not perception, while perception is 
also a function of reason. Since the sensual impressions in perception 
are copies and derivatives of intelligible forms, perception itself is a 
copy and derivative of Reason Principle, which is closer to the intel-
lectual, and thus absolute. 
      In the Risala of Alfarabi, intelligibles as forms, as abstracted from 
matter, are actualized intelligibles, as opposed to intelligibles in poten-
tiality, in re in matter, corresponding to the states of potential and ac-
tual intellect. Actualized intelligibles achieve a separate existence 
from potential intelligibles, as not subject to place and time, or the 
corporeal. Actualized intelligibles are intelligibles without categories, 
as they are not subject to discursive reason in potential intellect, and 
the categories attached to potential intelligibles are understood diffe-
rently in relation to actualized intelligibles. The distinction between 
the potential intelligible and the actual intelligible can be found in the 
function of words in language. 
      The ability of intellect to grasp the intelligible is the product of the 
cooperation of the material intellect and the agent intellect, the corpo-
real and incorporeal in the anima rationalis. The sensible phonetic 
form of the word is received in sense perception as the sensible form 
but it is only retained as an ephemeral mnemic residue in phantasia or 
imagination as an intelligible form, into which it has been transformed 
by the agent intellect, combining the potential intellect and the actual 
intellect. Once the word in language has become the intelligible form 
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in the imaginatio, then the material or actual intellect is able to reinsert 
it into the present particular of language use, as it is able to see it as 
illuminated by agent intellect. The dialectic of the sensible form and 
the intelligible constitutes thinking or intellection, constructs meaning, 
and makes communication possible. 
      In the Risala, the actualized intelligible becomes an object of 
thought in discursive reason, in actualized intellect; it becomes a con-
crete form of the abstract. The actualized intelligible would be as ma-
thematics in the system of Proclus, in which mathematical thought is 
dianoetic, combining dialectical and discursive processes. Mathemat-
ics in dianoetic thought corresponds to the type of thinking which ex-
ists between sense perception and intelligibles, as in the Republic of 
Plato the thought of mathematicians is like “reason but not intelli-
gence, meaning by reason something midway between opinion and in-
telligence” (511),3 and for Proclus it “traverses and unfolds the 
measureless content of nous by making articulate its concentrated in-
tellectual insight, and then gathers together again the things it has dis-
tinguished and refers them back to nous” as described in the 
Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements (4).4  
      The actualized intelligible is the articulation of the intellectual in-
sight, which becomes the subject of mathematics, which can be 
counted and included in a totality, as Alfarabi says in the Risala, 
“when [the intelligibles] become intelligibles in actuality, they be-
come, then, one of the things existing in the world, and they are 
counted, insofar as they are intelligibles, among the totality of existing 
things” (Hyman, p. 216). As opposed to perceptions of sensible ob-
jects, which “fix their attention on external things and concern them-
selves with objects whose causes they do not possess” (Commentary 
18), according to Proclus, mathematical thinking begins with numbers, 
which are copies of eternal ideas in the material world, actualized in-
telligibles, and then proceeds by dialectical processes towards the 
“ideas that it has within; it is awakened to activity by lower realities, 
but its destination is the higher being of forms.” The actualized intelli-
gibles lead discursive reason back to the intelligibles themselves, 
which are their source, as the sensible form or mathematical symbol 
leads discursive reason back to its source, the intelligible or mathemat-
ical concept. The motion of understanding in mathematics is not a 
physical motion given by the senses, according to Proclus, but a mo-
tion which “unfolds and traverses the immaterial cosmos of ideas, now 
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moving from first principles to conclusions…referring its results back 
to the principles that are prior in knowledge,” the intelligible of the in-
telligible form, the source of the sensible form or the word. 
      In the Risala, when the actualized intelligible becomes the object 
of the thought of the actualized intellect, the actualized intelligible and 
the actualized intellect are identical, as “that which is thought is then 
nothing but that which is in actuality an intellect” (Hyman, p. 216). 
When intellect has separated the intelligible from the object, the intel-
ligible becomes something other than the object, as identical to intel-
lect. In the hierarchy of intellects, acquired intellect functions as a 
template for actualized intellect, which is matter for acquired intellect, 
while actualized intellect functions as a template for the perception of 
matter. While in active intellect form is separated from matter, in ac-
tualized intellect form descends into matter, which is why active intel-
lect is compared to light, which bridges the immaterial and material 
and makes all things materially visible, and actualized intellect is 
compared to illumination, the activity of the active intellect. The ac-
tive or agent intellect “is a separated form which never existed in mat-
ter nor ever will exist in it” (p. 218), following Aristotle in the De 
anima, and which makes matter possible, as it actualizes intellect.  
      In the Risala, the “relation of the active intellect to the intellect 
which is in potentiality is like the relation of the sun to the eye which 
is sight in potentiality as long as it is in darkness” (Hyman, p. 218), 
not illuminated by the intelligibles of the agent intellect. Illumination 
is the equivalent of transparency, following Aristotle, who defined 
light as a transparent medium, and transparency is the equivalent of 
the rarefaction of light. The process of the rarefaction of light in mat-
ter is equivalent to the illumination of matter by form. Sight becomes 
actuality in the presence of light in the same way that potential intel-
lect becomes actual intellect in the presence of agent intellect. Sight 
becomes actuality “with the coming into being of the forms of visible 
things in the sight,” just as intellect becomes actuality with the coming 
into being of the forms as objects of intellect. Light becomes transpa-
rent in actuality because it is prepared by the light of the sun itself. 
Through the transparency which it provides, agent intellect becomes 
the principle or template for actualized intelligibles. 
      For Alfarabi, intellect ascends from the material to the agent intel-
lect as it ascends from the particular to the eternal, from the multiplici-
ty of divisions to the unity and simplicity of that which is indivisible. 
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In the ascent to agent intellect, we ascend “to the things which are 
more perfect in existence,” and we ascend “from that which is best 
known to us to that which is unknown” (Hyman, p. 219). The know-
ledge of things which are most accessible to intellect is the lowest 
form of knowledge; in order to develop, intellect must come to grasp 
the knowledge which is least accessible, must challenge its own limi-
tations. The more difficult something is to comprehend, the higher 
form of intellect it requires. The indivisible forms of agent intellect 
project a likeness of themselves onto matter, but they are only re-
ceived in matter as divided and corrupted, following Aristotle.  
      Though the forms of agent intellect are received as divided and 
corrupted, matter is nevertheless perfected in its reception of the arc-
hetypal forms; the sensible form is perfected by the intelligible form, 
though it can only be an inferior copy. The closer the sensible form 
can come to the intelligible form, the more it is perfected, as it is more 
incorporeal, and is illuminated more clearly in the oculus mentis. For 
Alfarabi, the ultimate perfection of intellect, the ultimate incorporeali-
ty in the corporeal, is “the ultimate happiness and the afterlife,” in 
which state the becoming of a substance, and substance in intellect, is 
achieved through a completely external force. For Alfarabi, acquired 
intellect requires no corporeal subsistence, and intellection is perfected 
when it is independent of sense perception and its own material me-
chanisms, that is, when it receives subsistence only from outside itself, 
when it knows what it knows only as itself and is in no way in itself. 
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